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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RACIAL DISCRIMINATION-ZONING
ORDINANCES. Negro plaintiffs, owners of certain real property in
an area zoned as white-residential, applied to the City of Birming-
ham for permits to build houses upon their property. These permits
were denied under an ordinance making it a misdemeanor for negroes
to reside in areas zoned as white-residential and for whites to reside
in areas zoned as negro-residential. Plaintiffs brought this action
for a declaratory judgment that the zoning ordinance denies plain-
tiffs' rights to use and occupancy of their property in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. It was held, one judge dissenting, that
the ordinance was unconstitutional, as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and was not a valid exercise of the state police power.
City of Birmingham v. Monk, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950).
Generally municipal corporations have been given the power
to enact and enforce zoning and use regulations by specific authoriza-
tion of zoning or enabling acts' and the constitutionality of such
powers has been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power.'
Some cities have sought to extend this principle to include segregation
ordinances but since the 1917 decision in Buchanan v. Warley" such
ordinances, though often cleverly worded,' have met with little
success in the Supreme Court.' In the Buchanan case' the court held
in a suit for specific performance that a Louisville ordinance for
segregation of races was unconstitutional as a restraint on alienation.
Cities which have sought to evade the effect of the Buchanan decision
have justified their cause by contending that: (1) they are exercising
their police power to prevent interracial conflict;' (2) they are seek-
ing the betterment of the negro race' and the promotion of peaceful
interracial relations; and (3) the Supreme Court decision in Plessy
v. Ferguson,' which upheld the validity of segregation in an intra-
state carrier, supports their position. The instant case presents a
variation of the first contention. Defendants argue that this is a
See e.g., Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (restricting the height
of buildings); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (restricting
business or residential. use of the property). North Dakota municipal
corporations are authorized to zone by N.D. Rev. Code of 1943 §40,4701;
also see Bismarck v. Hughes, 53 N.D. 838, 208 N.W. 711 (1926).
2 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §25.05 at page 18 (3rd ed. 1950).
3 Harden v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. 248, 93 S.E. 401 (1917); Harris v.
City of Louisville, 165 Ky. 559, 177 S.W. 472, impliedly rev'd, 245 U.S.
60 (1917); Hopkins v. City of Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 S.E. 139
(1915).
4 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
5 City of Richmond v. Dean, 37 F.2d 712 (4th Cir. 1930), aff'd mem., 281
U.S. 704 (1930) (no person could reside on street on which the majority
of the persons were those with whom he was forbidden to intermarry);
Tyler v. Harmon, 158 La. 439, 104 So. 200 (1925), rev'd mem., 273 U.S.
668 (1927) (person couldn't get building permit without consent of
majority of those on block); Harden v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. 248, 93
S.E. 401 (1917) (unlawful for person to build house on street on which
most of property owners are of the opposite race).
0 See City of Richmond v. Dean and Tyler v. Harmon, supra note 5, and
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
245 U.S. 60 (1917).
Hopkins v. City of Richmond, 117 Va. 692, 86 S.E. 139 (1915).
Harris v. City of Louisville, 165 Ky. 559, 177 S.W. 472, impliedly rev'd.
245 U.S. 60 (1917).
10 Harden v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. 248, 93 S.E. 401 (1917).
1 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
RECENT CASES
zoning ordinance, not a segregation ordinance, and that the ordinance
does not prevent plaintiffs from occupying their property solely
because of race and color but "is based and justified in part upon
the difference between the white and Negro races."" In Clinard v.
Winston-Salem,"2 the court agreed that the attempt to justify segre-
gation under a general zoning ordinance was distinguishable from
cases declaring segregation ordinances invalid. But that court held
that the decision in Buchanan v. Warley" was sufficiently broad to
cover ordinances restricting a property owner's right to the use and
occupancy of his property and declared the ordinance invalid. This
case, as well as most other cases since Buchanan v. Warley, points
out that the matter is beyond the reach of the police power insofar
as it conflicts with the constitutional right to use and occupy prop-
erty. Zoning restrictions must bear some substantial relationship to
public health, safety, morals or general welfare' and they must be
concerned primarily with the use of the property, not with its
ownership."
In view of the settled concept that the protection of the Four-
teenth Amendment is a personal right,' it would seem that the court
in the instant case has properly reasoned that the proposed extension
of the police power to justify an ordinance depriving plaintiffs of
their right to the use and occupation of their property is an unwar-
ranted encroachment on their rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Supreme Court has refused to allow this result by private
contract"8 and it is not expected that it would approve of the devious
means employed here. However commendable is the purpose to
prevent race conflicts, this aim, as was said in Buchanan v. Wa'rley,"'
"cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights
created or protected by the Federal Constitution."'"
Robert Alderman
185 F.2d 859, 861 (1950).
217 N.C. 119, 6 S.E.2d 867 (1940).
245 U.S. 60 (1917).
Ibid.
', Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Soc. v. Kansas City, Mo., 58 F.2d 593
(8th Cir. 1932), where it is said at page 598, "While such police power
is broad, there are limitations to its exercise, which the courts have not
attempted to define. However, restrictions by zoning ordinances imposed
upon the use of one's property to be valid must bear some 'substantial
relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.' The
reserved police power of the state must stop when it encroaches on the
protection accorded the citizen by the Federal constitution."
8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §25.07 at page 29 (3rd ed. 1950).
I Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
-' 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
.1 Id. at 81.
